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ABSTRACT
In the 1980s, Professor Derrick Bell posited a theory of interest
convergence as part of his critical race theory work, arguing that the
major strides forward in civil rights law and policy that benefited
African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s only occurred because of the
perceived benefits of those changes to white elites during that time. In
Bell’s view, it was only at the point at which the interests of powerful
whites converged with those of marginalized racial minorities that
significant changes in civil rights law could occur. Twelve years after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, numerous lawmakers,
scholars, activists, and policy makers find themselves entrenched in a
different struggle for civil and human rights: combating
counterterrorism laws and policies that overreach in their efforts to
detain, interrogate, surveil, and kill suspected terrorists. In this
Symposium Essay, I use Professor Bell’s theory of interest convergence
to frame the debate over an increasingly common counterterrorism tool:
the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to target and kill
individuals suspected of encouraging or planning terrorist acts.
Interest convergence theory can help us examine the shifting
parameters of the drone program in several ways: first, to map the areas
of interest convergence between politically powerful groups and those
interested in protecting marginalized groups such as Muslims and
Arabs, which can help explain why certain limitations on the use of
targeted killings have been put into place already; second, to consider
the plausibility of the fulfillment of the promises made by President
* Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law. J.D., Columbia
Law School, 1999; A.B., Stanford University, 1995. This symposium paper is based in part , 
an adapted from, a full-length article: Sudha Setty, National Security Interest Convergence, 4 
HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 185 (2012). I thank my colleagues, particularly Professor Bridgette
Baldwin, for organizing the symposium, Building the Arc of Justice: The Life and Legal
Thought of Derrick Bell, in September 2012, at which I presented the original version of this
paper. I thank the editors at the Western New England Law Review, particularly John Paul
Callahan, for their work on this Article.
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Obama in his May 2013 speech on the administration’s national security
policies, in which he stated that the parameters of the targeted killings
program will be narrowed; and third, in a limited fashion, to consider
whether interest convergence can offer guidance on pushing for further
limitations on the use of drones for targeted killings.
INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, transformed the
landscape of national security law and policy in the United States.
Nations around the globe stepped up their counterterrorism laws and
policies, making the consequences of being labeled a terrorist by
domestic governments more severe.1 In the post-9/11 era—one marked 
by tensions over indefinite detentions, extraordinary rendition and
torture, racial and religious profiling, and the use of targeted killings— 
lawmakers, scholars, activists, and policymakers have routinely
confronted the question of whether and to what extent robust
counterterrorism laws and policies should be curtailed to protect against
the abuse or potential abuse of civil rights and liberties.2 Fear of future
attacks, the allocation of power without robust oversight of the executive
1. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (mandating that all UN
member nations take proactive steps to combat terrorism, including increasing criminalization
and implementing harsher sentencing for terrorist acts, freezing funds of those fina ncing
terrorist acts, sharing intelligence information with other member nations, and tightening
border controls to prevent the migration of terrorists). See generally Kim Lane Scheppele,
Other People’s Patriot Acts: Europe’s Response to September 11, 50 LOY. L. REV. 89, 91-92,
97-98 (2004) (detailing UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which mandated that countries
institute laws combating terrorism, and noting significant shifts in domestic counterterrorism
laws as a result).
2. By “rights protection,” I mean those actions taken to protect, improve, or expand the
civil and human rights of those most negatively impacted by the U.S. government’s post-
September 11, 2001, counterterrorism policies. Although judges, scholars, and lawyers can
argue as to the efficacy and legality of such measures, within the United States, the disparate
impact of post-September 11 counterterrorism laws and policies has been borne heavily by
Muslims, Arabs, and people hailing from South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. See,
e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN L. REV. 953, 957 (2002) (couching the disparate
treatment of counterterrorism policies as falling on “Arab non-citizens”); Gil Gott, The Devil
We Know: Racial Subordination and National Security Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1073, 1073
(2005) (analyzing how “liberal democratic systems might evolve . . . to counter the socially
and politically pernicious effects of . . . religiously-inflected, all-or-nothing warfare”); Natsu
Taylor Saito, Beyond the Citizen/Alien Dichotomy: Liberty, Security, and the Exercise of
Plenary Power, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 389, 391–92 (2005) (defining otherness
as based on race, national origin, ethnicity, and other factors apart from citizenship);
Girardeau A. Spann, Terror and Race, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 89, 101–02 (2005) (observing that
“the sacrifice of racial minority interests for majoritarian gain appears to be an intrinsic feature
of United States culture”); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counter-
Terrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010).
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branch, fear of appearing “soft on terror,” and political intransigence
have often derailed or severely limited efforts to enhance protections of
civil rights and liberties, although robust debate on these issues
continues.3 
In May 2013, President Obama gave his second4 major national
security policy speech, discussing a number of national security and
foreign policy priorities, but focusing in large part on the parameters of
the administration’s targeted killing program.5 In it, he argued that the
use of unmanned aerial vehicles (“drones”) to kill suspected terrorists is
effective, legal, and necessary, yet also acknowledged legal, foreign
policy, and political constraints on the program.6 Some critics were
disappointed that the speech did not place additional meaningful limits
on the president’s authority to use drones, and that the president’s 
promises of transparency and adequate oversight were unsupported by
specific details or plans.7 
3. The need to create additional limitations on national security policies operates from
the premise that such limitations are necessary. Many thoughtful scholars have argued that
the current structures in place with regard to numerous security policies, including targeted
killings, have achieved a positive, if not ideal, balance of individual rights and security
imperatives. See, e.g., Matthew C. Waxman, Going Clear, FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (Mar. 20,
2013), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/20/going_clear (arguing that greater
transparency with regard to the drone program may not be an improvement over the current
situation); Robert M. Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, in 13 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (M. N. Schmitt et al., eds., 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1754223 (arguing that the Obama administration has satisfied its
international law obligations with regard to the targeted killing of U.S. citizen Anwar al -
Awlaki); see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENT AFTER 9/11 (2012) (arguing that executive power has been appropriately
constrained by various factors in the post-9/11 era).
4. President Obama gave his first major speech on national security in 2009. See
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks on National Security (May 21, 2009),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-
5-21-09.
5. Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks at the National Defense University 
(May 23, 2013) [hereinafter “May 2013 NDU Speech”], available at http://www.whitehouse.g
ov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-university.
6. Id.
7. E.g., Glenn Greenwald, Obama’s Speech: Seeing What You Want to See, 
THEGUARDIAN.COM (May 27, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/m
ay/27/obama-war-on-terror-speech (arguing that President Obama’s speech was mostly
rhetoric meant to appease critics from a variety of political perspectives); Fred Kaplan,
Obama’s Post-9/11 World, SLATE.COM (May 23, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/news
_and_politics/war_stories/2013/05/barack_obama_national_defense_university_speech_nothi 
ng_new_about_drones.html (noting that President Obama’s speech outlined limits that were
almost identical to those already in place and that the Justice Department had defined those
limitations in ways that rendered the restrictions “meaningless”). Some politically
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This Paper draws on Professor Derrick Bell’s theory of interest
convergence to frame the debates over limitations on the Obama
administration’s use of drones to target and kill individuals suspected of
encouraging and planning terrorist acts. Interest convergence can be
understood as the process by which the divergent self-interests of
different groups overlap to the degree necessary to enable serious policy
change. Where Bell used interest convergence theory to analyze judicial
and political decision-making during the African-American civil rights
movement of the mid-twentieth century, this paper applies the same
theoretical lens to the post-9/118 program of targeted killings by the
United States, in which members of Muslim and Arab communities are
disparately impacted.9 
Interest convergence theory can help us examine the shifting
parameters of the drone program in several ways: first, to map interest
convergence between powerful groups and less politically powerful
groups, which can help explain existing limitations on the use of targeted
killings; second, to consider the likelihood that the parameters of the
targeted killings program will be narrowed as suggested by President
Obama in his May 2013 national security policy speech; and third, in a
limited fashion, to consider whether interest convergence can offer
guidance in the future on pushing for further limitations on the use of
targeted killings.
Part I considers how interest convergence theory reflects the
realities of the post-9/11 political decision-making process, and how the
theory should be used to evaluate the targeted killings program and the
shifts in policy that have already occurred. Part II considers the targeted
killings program in terms of foreign policy pressures and domestic
political dynamics to understand how and why the program has
developed to its current point. Part III considers the limits of interest
conservative critics argued that President Obama’s speech largely consisted of rhetoric to
appease liberal voters concerned about the administration’s use of drones, but that Obama’s 
substantive policy and approach to executive power was similar to that of President George
W. Bush. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Obama’s Artful Anguish, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2013, at
SR11; Benjamin Wittes, The President’s Speech: A Quick and Dirty Reaction—Part 1 (Are
We At War?), LAWFARE BLOG (May 23, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/05/the-
presidents-speech-a-quick-and-dirty-reaction-part-1/.
8. Scholars recognized but did not focus on the potential application of interest
convergence theory soon after September 11. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto et al., American
Racial Justice on Trial—Again: African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War
on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1331–33 (2003).
9. For a detailed discussion of the theory of “national security interest convergence” that
can be used to frame the larger issue of post-9/11 decision making and identify potential bases
on which legislative coalitions may form, see Sudha Setty, National Security Interest
Convergence, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 185 (2012).
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convergence as a frame for considering these issues and offers some
sense of how lawmakers and policy experts interested in curtailing the
targeted killings program can find opportunities to generate support for
rights-protective policies.
I.		 INTEREST CONVERGENCE THEORY AND TARGETED KILLINGS
Elected politicians, by the very nature of their position, will
generally act in their political self-interest to get re-elected, maintain
influence within their party, and satisfy influential constituents and
interest groups.10 These political imperatives may subsequently
compromise their ability to follow their ideological convictions.11 In the 
current political environment, in which being labeled as “soft on
terrorism”12 can cause significant damage and jeopardize a politician’s 
chance for re-election,13 politicians interested in rights protection must
10. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 111 (1964) (describing politics as “the uncontrolled
child of competing interests and ideologies”).
11. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 244 (Harvard 1991) (“[A]s a
politician/statesman, each representative is interested in getting reelected. Subject to this
constraint, they will try to use their influence on behalf of the ‘public good,’ as they
conscientiously define it. But they will be reluctant to play the role of politician/statesman
when it seriously endangers their reelection chances.”).
12. Prominent members of the Republican Party, for example, criticized President
Obama’s May 2013 national security speech on just such grounds. See Khalid Kattak and
Janet Hook, Verdict From the GOP: Obama is Wrong, WASH. WIRE, WALL ST. J. (May 23,
2013, 5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/05/23/verdict-from-the-gop-obama-is-
wrong/ (offering critique from various GOP politicians that President Obama’s plans for
scaling back on military operations in foreign countries, potentially setting stricter parameters
for the use of drones and closing the Guantanamo Bay detention facility would weaken U.S.
security). For almost a decade, a politician’s ability to be perceived as “tough on terrorism” is
seen as a predicate of a successful political campaign. President George W. Bush governed
and ran for re-election in 2004 based largely on the promise that he would continue to be
“tough on terror.” This strategy was obviously successful, as evidenced by Bush’s re-election
and the maintenance of a Republican majority in the House and Senate that year. See DAVID
COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 99 (2007) (citing CNN exit polls from the 2004
presidential election which suggested that voters trusted Republicans in the area of national
security); see also David E. Sanger & Jodi Wilgoren, Bush Adds Teeth to His Attacks on
Kerry, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/politics/campaign/19
bush.html (describing Bush’s presidential campaign tactics during the last 15 days of the
campaign, including his “scathing attack on Mr. Kerry’s national security record” and
capitalizing on “the perception that [President Bush] is strong against terrorism—and . . .
continuing doubts about whether Mr. Kerry is tough enough”).
13. Efforts to avoid the label of “soft on terror” have effectively disallowed
straightforward discourse on rights protection in the United States since President Obama took
office. When rights-protective proposals are brought forward, various interest groups frame
those initiatives as a weakness that generates political vulnerability. The 2009 debates over
the closure of the prison facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, illustrate this dynamic. See David
M. Herszenhorn, Senate Leaders Balk at Closing Guantanamo Prison, N.Y. TIMES (May 19,
2009, 11:48 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/19/senate-leaders-balk-at-
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find ways to make such initiatives politically viable. The moral
imperative to make a political decision may not serve as the primary
motivation for a politician to cast a vote in favor of a rights-protective 
choice if that choice is unpopular but protects politically powerless
groups.14 Casting such a vote may require that the choice be politically
advantageous, as well as progressive in terms of rights protection.15 If
enough politicians are so persuaded, Congress can fulfill its obligation
and potential to enact rights-protective laws.16 Political interest
convergence occurs when different political groups aggregate to form an
issue-specific coalition that is large enough to effect serious policy
change in this regard.17 
closing-guantanamo-prison/ (noting that although Democratic leaders had initially supported
closure of the Guantanamo facility due to concerns over detainee treatment there, they
retreated from that position after partisan rhetoric that emphasized the danger of coddling
“terrorists”). This makes it difficult for politicians to promulgate rights-protective proposals
that benefit these minority populations.
14. Madison, on the eve of the 1787 Constitutional Convention, wrote that politicians
can be motivated by political interest, ambition, and public good, but are largely motivated by
the interest and ambition, not by moral imperatives. James Madison, Vices of the Political
System of the United States, ¶ 11 (Apr. 1787), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch5s16.html. Madison noted that ordinary citizens
were even more prone to act without regard for the greater good. He suggested that although
individuals motivated by the good of the community, character, and religious conviction
would be ideal, in reality none of these factors would likely prevail over acting in one’s self-
interest. Id.; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (noting that “we well know
that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control ” on political
interests).
15. Likewise, commentators have noted that political competition reliably involves
accusations that a political opponent’s claims of acting to further a just cause are, in reality,
simply a political ploy to garner support from certain constituents. See Nancy L. Rosenblum,
“Extremism” and Anti-Extremism in American Party Politics, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES,
843, 877 (2002); cf. REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 9, 58–59, 164 (2006) (arguing
that Congress has acted in rights-protective ways as a matter of principle, such as the passage
of post-Civil War legislation like the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
16. Rebecca Zietlow considers this kind of legislation to protect “rights of belonging,”
which she describes as “those rights that promote an inclusive vision of who belongs to the
national community of the United States and that facilitate equal membership in that
community.” ZIETLOW, supra note 15, at 6.
17. However, some political philosophers have questioned whether the law or the mere
exercise of brute political power is even an appropriate mechanism to achieve the policy goals
of security, democracy, and human rights. See, e.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Does the
Constitutionalization of International Law Still Have a Chance?, in THE DIVIDED WEST 115-
16 (Ciaran Cronin ed., 2007). Nonetheless, the effect of legal realist thinking among the
legislative and executive branches with regard to national security is that legal comfort and
structures serve as the architecture for any number of rights-denigrating policies, the brunt of
which have been borne by outsider groups. See Sudha Setty, No More Secret Laws: How
Disclosure of Executive Branch Legal Policy Doesn’t Let the Terrorists Win , 57 U. KAN. L.
REV. 579, 580–81 (2009) (arguing that Bush administration policies regarding detainee
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A.		 Interest Convergence Theory
This kind of political self-interest allows for a valuable application
of Professor Derrick Bell’s interest convergence theory. Bell, a
prominent critical race theorist, developed his interest convergence
theory in the 1980s to better understand key Supreme Court decisions
and legislative actions in the African-American civil rights movement of
the mid-twentieth century. Bell’s interest convergence theory in that
context held that politically powerful groups in the United States
(namely elite whites) would only support racial justice initiatives at the
point where an instrumentalist analysis suggested such support to be
worthwhile.
Bell posited that a decision such as Brown v. Board of Education, 18 
often hailed as a seminal case demonstrating the judicial commitment to
equal protection in the United States, is rather a reflection of a need to
fulfill interests of the white majority population, which incidentally
benefit blacks.19 In particular, Bell viewed Brown as part of the U.S.
government’s effort to improve its human rights record during the Cold
War, an era in which the United States was battling the Soviet Union for
influence in postcolonial emerging democracies.20 Bell concluded that
without such motivations appealing to government and elite white
interests, decisions like Brown likely would never have been made. 
Bell’s Cold War interest convergence hypothesis relied upon some 
treatment would not exist without legal comfort offered by Justice Department lawyers).
Therefore, considering the nature of how political power is aggregated becomes an important
aspect of determining potential means to curb overreaching policies.
18. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the racial segregation of
public schoolchildren was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
19. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). Bell queries why, in 1954, the principle of “separate but equal”
became constitutionally untenable, when segregation laws similar to those challenged in
Brown had been upheld consistently for the prior 100 years. Id. at 523-24. He concludes that:
[T]he availability of Fourteenth Amendment protection in racial cases may not
actually be determined by the character of harm suffered. . . . Racial remedies may
instead be the outward manifestations of unspoken and perhaps subconscious
judicial conclusions that the remedies, if granted, will secure, advance, or at least
not harm societal interests deemed important by middle and upper class whites.
Racial justice—or its appearance—may, from time to time, be counted among the
interests deemed important by the courts and by society’s policymakers.
Id. at 523. For powerful analyses supporting the applicability of interest convergence theory
to Brown v. Board of Education, see generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS:
RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000); Richard Delgado, Explaining the
Rise and Fall of African-American Fortunes: Interest Convergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369 (2002).
20. See Bell, supra note 19, at 524; see also DUDZIAK, supra note 19.
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of the same foreign policy dynamics that have raised concerns about
U.S. counterterrorism programs in the post-9/11 context. First, the racist
domestic policies of the United States during World War II and early
Cold War eras, such as Jim Crow segregation, were widely publicized by
the Soviet Union in anti-American messaging to emerging, post-colonial
democracies that were in the process of forming their geopolitical
allegiances.21 A modern analogy is considering the need of the United
States to win over the “hearts and minds” of the Muslim world, a stated
priority from the early days of the Obama administration.22 Second, the
Truman administration argued that the improvement of the U.S. civil
rights record was essential as part of the overall Cold War strategy. 23 
21. DUDZIAK, supra note 19, at 12 (describing extensive international attention given to
racial discrimination sanctioned by the U.S. Government, and the use of U.S. racial problems
by the Soviet Union in the late 1940s to stoke foreign relations problems for the United States
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America). Dudziak asserts that “[c]oncern about the effect of U.S.
race discrimination on Cold War foreign relations led the Truman administration to adopt a
pro-civil rights posture as part of its international agenda to promote democracy and contain
communism.” Id. at 27. This thinking was reflected in contemporaneous media accounts,
such as a New York Times Magazine article published in 1948 in which the author laments
that although “the nation finds itself the most powerful spokesman for the democratic way of
life . . . [i]t is unpleasant to have the Russians publicize our continuing lynchings, our Jim
Crow statutes and customs, our anti-Semitic discriminations and our witch-hunts; but is it
undeserved?” Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted). Dudziak offers further evidence in the
reports of diplomats and State Department officials expressing concern as to the extent to
which U.S. racial discrimination undermined U.S. foreign policy efforts. Id. at 29–39.
22. See, e.g., Christian Brose, From One Cairo Speech to Another,
FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (June 4, 2009, 7:08 PM), http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/200
9/06/04/from_one_cairo_speech_to_another (noting Obama’s patent efforts to appeal to the
hearts and minds of Muslim listeners).
23. See PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS 100-01 
(1947) [hereinafter TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS] (noting that “our civil rights record has
growing international implications. These cannot safely be disregarded by the government at
the national level which is responsible for our relations with the world” and arguing that
powers usually left to the states such as law enforcement, voting, and education, may need to
be shifted to the federal level to deal with the international implications of U.S. racial
discrimination). The Committee report bluntly stated the need for improving race relations in
the United States as a foreign policy and security matter:
Our position in the postwar world is so vital to the future that our smallest actions
have far-reaching effects. We have come to know that our own security in a highly
interdependent world is inextricably tied to the security and well-being of all people
and all countries. Our foreign policy is designed to make the United States an
enormous, positive influence for peace and progress throughout the world. We have
tried to let nothing, not even extreme political differences between ourselves and
foreign nations, stand in the way of this goal. But our domestic civil rights
shortcomings are a serious obstacle.
Id. at 146; see also Harry S Truman, President of the U.S., Special Message to the Congress
on Civil Rights (Feb. 2, 1948) (emphasizing the need to improve race relations in the United
States as part of a national security imperative). The Truman administration also offered
moral and economic justifications for improving the U.S. civil rights record. See DUDZIAK, 
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The Truman administration simultaneously argued that the judiciary
should play an active role in improving and enforcing racial equality.24 
President Truman’s Justice Department filed an amicus brief in Brown v.
Board of Education that explicitly contextualized the case in the Cold
War era imperative of spreading democracy throughout the world.25 In
the post-9/11 context, the relevant elite interest is to build coalitions
among peer nations and, particularly as President Obama took office, the
need to repair frayed alliances with European nations skeptical of some 
U.S. counterterrorism programs during the George W. Bush
administration.26 
Bell’s interest convergence theory was not limited to judicial
decision-making. He argued that executive action can also be
understood through interest convergence theory, citing President
Abraham Lincoln’s use of the Emancipation Proclamation27 to
undermine Confederate troop strength by empowering Southern blacks
to stop fighting and working for the Confederacy.28 In terms of
legislative action at the time, Bell contended that the post-Civil War
amendments not only protected the interests of the newly emancipated
slaves, but also helped solidify the political prospects of the Republican
Party.29 
supra note 19, at 79–80.
24. See TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 23, at 105–10 (citing the constitutional
responsibilities of the judiciary to improve and enforce racial justice).
25. Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), 1952 WL 82045 at *6. The Truman administration describes the government’s 
interest in the case in blunt foreign policy terms:
It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that
the problem of racial discrimination must be viewed. The United States is trying to
prove to the people of the world, of every nationality, race, and color, that a free
democracy is the most civilized and secure form of government yet devised by man.
We must set an example for others by showing firm determination to remove
existing flaws in our democracy.
The existence of discrimination against minority groups in the United States has
an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. Racial discrimination
furnishes grist for the Communist propaganda mills, and it raises doubts even
among friendly nations as to the intensity of our devotion to the democratic faith.
Id.
26. See Robin Wright, U.S. Struggles to Win Hearts, Minds in the Muslim World, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 2004, at A1 (noting the struggles of the Bush administration to combat
anti-American sentiment in Muslim nations); Brose, supra note 22 (considering the differing
approaches of Obama and Bush to the question of soft power among peer nations).
27. Bell, supra note 19, at 524.
28. Derrick A. Bell, Brown v. Board of Education: Reliving and Learning from Our
Racial History, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 24 (2004).
29. Id. at 23. Bell’s interest convergence theory has been applied to modern legislative
actions as well, such as the recent efforts to cut back the prison population—a move that will
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Although Bell’s interest convergence work focused largely on 
African-American civil rights, his framework for evaluating judicial and
political decision-making lends itself to the post-9/11 security context in
which Muslims and Arabs are the disparately impacted groups, and are
the only groups whose members are known to have been included on the
government’s targeted killings list.30 Bell recognized that some whites
who worked toward racial justice in the 1950s and 1960s were motivated
by the morally-driven recognition that racial equality was an important
goal regardless of ancillary benefits in terms of international or domestic
relations. However, Bell believed that the number of whites motivated
solely by racial justice was simply insufficient to effect reform.31 
The same may be said for politicians in the post-9/11 context.
Rights-protective arguments that were once championed by Democrats
in Congress—for example, complying with the best practices under
international law with regard to counterterrorism operations, demanding
transparency of counterterrorism programs, and creating a more robust
due process for terrorism suspects32—have, as Bell might have observed,
collapsed due to a lack of political will absent broad public support that
undoubtedly benefit the poor people of color who make up a disproportionately large sector of
the prison population, but also appeals to fiscal conservatives. See Michelle Alexander, In
Prison Reform, Money Trumps Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2011, at WK9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/opinion/15alexander.html; Jesse Washington, NAACP
Joins With Gingrich in Urging Prison Reform, ASSOCIATED PRESS (April 7, 2011),
http://cnsnews.com/news/article/naacp-joins-gingrich-urging-prison-reform. The article
described the interest of fiscal conservative Grover Norquist as follows: “Norquist said his
group got involved because when it comes to making the argument for reducing the number of
prisoners, ‘liberals can’t do it. People say, “You just want to let all the murderers out.” But
we are spending a great deal of money keeping people in prison, and for many of them it
doesn’t make sense to keep them there year after year.’” Id.
30. The government’s targeted killing list is kept secret, so knowledge of the
background of the targets is not verifiable. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’
Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1. However,
all of the targets who have been identified thus far have been Muslim and/or Arab, and
signature strikes against groups of individuals (without a specific named target in the group),
have only been used in Pakistan and Yemen. Id.
31. See Bell, supra note 19, at 525 (asserting that “the number [of whites] who would
act on morality alone was insufficient to bring about the desired racial reform.”).
32. E.g., The Legal Rights of Guantanamo Detainees: What Are They, Should They Be
Changed, and is an End in Sight? Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland
Sec., S. Committee on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 231-32 (2007) (statement of Sen. Russ
Feingold, Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. and Homeland Sec., S. Judiciary Comm.) (arguing
that due process rights have been compromised); see John J. Farmer, Jr., Introduction:
Awaiting “the Authorities”: 9/11 and National Security Doctrine After Ten Years, 63 
RUTGERS L. REV. 1085, 1092 (2010) (stating that although Democrats initially supported
rights-protective measures, they began in 2009 to reverse and decided to keep Guantanamo
Bay open indefinitely, with detainees being held preventatively without charges or a trial, and
to reauthorize the Patriot Act’s surveillance provisions).
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might have conferred a benefit on the politicians.33 
I have posited elsewhere that there are numerous areas in which
political interest convergence can occur in ways that may benefit those
groups most negatively impacted by overreaching counterterrorism
policies. Specifically, I argued that U.S. foreign policy interests may 
serve to compel more rights-protective laws and policies;34 that
politically conservative libertarians may demand restrictions on
oppressive counterterrorism policy that may affect right-wing 
constituencies, which may in turn benefit Arabs and Muslims as an
ancillary matter;35 and that the public—and by extension, some 
politicians—would object to counterterrorism policies once it became
clear that those policies negatively affected the majority of the U.S.
population and not only certain racial and religious minorities.36 These 
dynamics have, in fact, helped to shape the parameters of U.S. targeted
killings program in its current state.37 
B.		 Targeted Killings as an Exemplar
The United States’ use of drones for targeted killings38 of suspected
33. See Max Fisher, Why Democrats Should Run on National Security, ATLANTIC (Feb.
22, 2010, 2:37 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/02/whydemocratsshou
ld-run-on-national-security/36367/ (arguing that Democrats should frame the issue of national
security on their own terms even though “specific policies—civilian trials for terrorists,
banning torture—poll poorly,” but recognizing the administration’s reluctance because “[t]he
White House likely fears that tying Obama too publicly to his unpopular policies will tarnish
his generalized popularity on national security.”).
34. See Setty, supra note 9, at 211-12 (arguing that “government responses to concerns
that the United States has flouted its own human rights standards, disregarded the rule of law,
and lacked sensitivity to Muslims around the world, have served not only moral interests, but
realpolitik interests as well”) (internal citations omitted).
35. See id. at 219-23 (noting the sustained efforts of libertarians to curtail the
applicability of lone wolf provisions of the Patriot Act from possibly applying to right -wing
gun enthusiasts).
36. See id. (noting that “at the point that the mainstream public finds that it is impacted
negatively by the creep of national security measures on constitutionally guaranteed freedoms
and liberties, opposition tends to grow dramatically”) (internal citations omitted).
37. See infra Part II.
38. Although targeted killing is not defined under international law, it is often
considered to encompass “premeditated acts of lethal force employed by states in times of
peace or during armed conflict to eliminate specific individuals outside their custody. ” See
Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (May 23, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. Although the governments that
utilize targeted killings differentiate them from assassinations, see Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of
International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (March 25, 2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm, critics view them as
similar actions in terms of illegality. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Al-Aulaqi, et al. v. Panetta, No.
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terrorists has expanded significantly since President Obama took office
in 2009.39 The Obama administration has consistently emphasized the
necessity, efficacy, and legality of targeted killings as an important
counterterrorism tool.40 However, the program has prompted much 
debate over the threshold question of whether such a program ought to
exist,41 the moral calculus,42 legal parameters and authorities for such a
program,43 and specific questions regarding the legality of its scope in
terms of geographic location of the target and citizenship of the target.44 
The parameters and future of the targeted killings program should be
considered in the context of two Obama administration positions as to
the nature of the battle being fought: first, the assertion that the theater of
war for U.S. counterterrorism efforts is not restricted geographically and,
therefore, encompasses the entire globe;45 and second, statements made
by administration officials in early 2013 that although the country should
not remain on a war footing permanently, we should expect the current
1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July 18, 2012).
39. See Drone Database, NEW AM. FOUND., http://natsec.newamerica.net/about (last
visited Feb. 4, 2014) (detailing the number of drone strikes by the United States in Yemen and
Pakistan since 2004).
40. See Koh, supra note 38; Eric Holder, Attorney General, U.S., Speech at
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov
/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html (outlining the parameters used by the
Obama administration to determine whether a targeted killing comports with international and
domestic legal obligations).
41. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings , U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) (by Philip Alston) (questioning the legality of the CIA
drone program).
42. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Drones and the Dilemma of
Modern Warfare, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2268596 (theorizing the moral
dilemma of drone use in the context of warfare in which geographic and other traditional
boundaries of violence are distorted).
43. See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 41, at ¶ 28-92 (discussing international
law of war principles with regard to targeted killings); Holder, supra note 40; Jeh C. Johnson,
Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., Speech on National Security Law, Lawyers, and Lawyering in 
the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), available at http://www.cfr.org/defense-and-
security/jeh-johnsons-speech-national-security-law-lawyers-lawyering-obama-
administration/p27448 (echoing previous administration legal justifications for targeted
killing); Koh, supra note 38 (arguing that the Obama administration’s use of targeted killing
as a counterterrorism tool complied with international and domestic legal obligations).
44. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (dismissing, based on
standing grounds, the suit of Nasser al-Aulaqi to enjoin the U.S. government from keeping his
son, U.S. citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi, on its targeted killing list).
45. Spencer Ackerman, Spec Ops Chief Sees ‘10 to 20 Years’ More for War Against al-
Qaida, WIRED.COM (May 16, 2013), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/05/decades-of-
war/ (discussing the Senate testimony of Michael Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, with regard to the global theater of war).
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counterterrorism efforts to last at least ten to twenty years longer.46 
The parameters of the targeted killing program remain largely
shielded from public view, with limited information being disclosed in
occasional speeches during President Obama’s first term47 and the leak
of a classified Department of Justice memorandum detailing some of the
legal bases for the program.48 In his May 2013 speech, President Obama 
looked to both defend the legality of the targeted killings program and 
arguably to narrow its parameters.49 
Given the boundless geographic scope and lengthy predicted
duration of this conflict, alongside the administration’s robust defense of
both the effectiveness and legality of the program, interest convergence
can help us understand why the Obama administration has placed the
specific restrictions on the program that it has, and what the potential of
those restrictions might be.
II. FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS AND DOMESTIC PRESSURES
Two key areas identified by Bell in his original interest
convergence work were the promotion of foreign policy interests50 and
the protection against domestic discontent.51 Both dynamics are key to
understanding how the Obama administration’s targeted killing policy
has evolved thus far.
A.		 Foreign Policy Concerns
As in the early years of the Cold War, when effective foreign policy
depended heavily on the ability to garner and maintain the respect and
allegiance of other nations, preserve the willingness of our allies to
46. Id. (relating the Senate testimony of Michael Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, with regard to the probable
duration of the U.S. counterterrorism effort against al-Qaida).
47. E.g., John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. and
Counterterrorism, Remarks concerning strengthening our security by adhering to our values
and laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/0
9/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an; Koh, supra
note 38.
48. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE WHITE PAPER: LAWFULNESS
OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR
OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE [hereinafter “DOJ White
Paper”], available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_W
hite_Paper.pdf. 
49. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 5.
50. See Setty, supra note 9, at 211-13.
51. See id. at 213 (discussing Bell’s evaluation of the need for U.S. racial policies to
protect against a domestic uprising).
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cooperate on policy and security matters, and polish the image of the
United States as vanguard of human rights,52 the foreign policy interests
of the United States in the post-9/11 context are clear. Even before he
became president, Obama signaled the desire to re-engage with the
international community as a matter of legal compliance (e.g., outlawing
the use of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques”),53 as good
foreign policy (i.e., restoring America’s moral authority in the world)54 
and as a matter of restoring the rule of law.55 
These themes were and are an important part of President Obama’s 
view of his administration: they permeated Obama’s campaign rhetoric
in 2008;56 his first national security policy speech in May 2009;57 a 
March 2010 speech on the legality and efficacy of drone warfare given
by Harold Koh, then-Legal Advisor to the State Department;58 a speech
on security and upholding the rule of law given by John Brennan, then-
Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism,
in September 2011;59 a speech by Jeh C. Johnson, then General Counsel
to the Department of Defense, in February 2012;60 and a speech of Eric
Holder, Attorney General, in March 2012.61 
The relationship between foreign policy and rights-protective
interest convergence has two key aspects. First, the U.S. government, at
least since 2009, has looked to garner the support and loyalty of allied
nations that were skeptical of Bush-era U.S. antiterrorism efforts that
were perceived as dismissive of the countries’ own priorities and cultural
52. See id. at 211.
53. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (reiterating the
international and domestic law parameters for interrogations of detainees suspected of terrorist
activity).
54. Obama: We’ve Restored America’s Standing, CNN (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/11/18/obama.henry/ (President Obama describing the
ways in which the global community has improved its impression of United States foreign
policy in the time since he took office).
55. Adam Cohen, Democratic Pressure on Obama to Restore the Rule of Law, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2008, at A32, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/14/opinion/
14fri4.html (noting that Democratic legislators were planning to hold then President-Elect
Obama to his campaign promises to restore the rule of law).
56. See id.
57. See Obama, supra note 4.
58. See Koh, supra note 38.
59. See Brennan, supra note 47 (stating that “President Obama has directed that all our
actions—even when conducted out of public view—remain consistent with our laws and
values”).
60. See Johnson, supra note 43.
61. See Holder, supra note 40.
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norms.62 This, in many respects, reflects the most natural application of
Bell’s interest convergence theory, which addressed the interests of the
U.S. political elites in the context of the Cold War. The Brown v. Board
of Education decision helped the United States market itself as a post-
World War II moral authority, responsive to the concerns of emerging
democracies and to the growing international focus on human rights
treaties and protocols.63 In the post-9/11 context (and, more specifically
here, the post-Bush administration context), the U.S. government has
made various rights protective changes in response to concerns that the
United States has flouted its own human rights standards, disregarded
the rule of law, and lacked sensitivity to Muslims around the world.
These changes have served not only moral interests, but also the
realpolitik interests of rebuilding trust and loyalty from traditionally
allied nations.64 
Second, the U.S. government has steadfastly held that military and
homeland security readiness depends on cooperative security efforts and
shared intelligence from allied nations.65 Military leaders have opined
that unilateral action, although possible, is less desirable and often less
successful than joint operations.66 Further, a majority of the American
public desires that the government continue seeking multilateral
solutions to transnational issues,67 which provides popular support for
working with allied nations on issues like counterterrorism, even if the
result is sometimes a compromise in American foreign policy goals to
build such a coalition.
Fulfillment of these interests, however, demands more than rhetoric
62. See Brennan, supra note 47 (stating that maintaining strong alliances through
upholding the rule of law was imperative).
63. Bell argues that white elites, in government and in the powerful strata of U.S.
society, benefited immediately from the Brown decision in that it provided immediate
credibility to U.S. efforts to counter Communist threats and increase its sphere of influence in
developing nations. See Bell, supra note 19, at 524 (citing a Time magazine article in which
the Brown decision is described as having a profound international impact in terms of
improving the perception of U.S. leadership and moral standing).
64. See Setty, supra note 9, at 212.
65. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 122 (2010).
66. See ADMIRAL MICHAEL G. MULLEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2011:
REDEFINING AMERICA’S MILITARY LEADERSHIP 1 (Feb. 2011) (noting that allied nations face
similar security challenges from similar threats, and that cooperation is preferable to
attempting to safeguard homeland security unilaterally).
67. See PEW RESEARCH CTR FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, BEYOND RED VS. BLUE:
THE POLITICAL TYPOLOGY 90 (May 2011) [hereinafter PEW POL. TYPOLOGY] (finding that
53% of the public supports the U.S. taking into account the interest of allies, despite the
possible resultant policy compromises).
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about the efficacy and legality of the drone program that cannot actually
be examined and verified because of executive branch secrecy.  After all,
the goals of restoring America’s standing in the world and reasserting
the primacy of the rule of law vis-à-vis counterterrorism policies cannot
be achieved if there is significant evidence that the United States is
actually undermining those principles. For example, since 2009,68 the
media has reported on villages in Pakistan and Yemen in which many 
innocent people, including children in several cases, have been killed or
maimed by drone strikes,69 despite previous administration assurances
that no or few civilians have been killed by such strikes.70 These
narratives, reports, photos, and video only serve to undermine efforts to
engender trust in the United States as a moral leader concerned about the
rule of law and human rights, and instead have led to terrorist
organizations using evidence of civilian casualties as a recruiting tool.71 
Compounding the problematic aspects of the accuracy, efficacy,
and legality of the drone program is the incredibly high level of secrecy
that the administration has maintained around the program. The
administration has referenced and explained only certain aspects of the
targeted killings programs numerous times72 prior to President Obama’s 
68. See Becker & Shane, supra note 30 (discussing a 2009 drone strike that “killed not
only its intended target, but also two neighboring families, and left behind a trail of cluster
bombs that subsequently killed more innocents . . . . Videos of children’s bodies and angry
tribesmen holding up American missile parts flooded YouTube, fueling a ferocious backlash
that Yemeni officials said bolstered Al Qaeda”).
69. See, e.g., Rebecca Murray, Anger at US Drone War Continues in Yemen, 
ALJAZEERA (June 7, 2013, 12:25 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/06/20
1365122319329623.html (describing the local anger at the U.S. drone strike that killed
members of a family in a village); Eye of the Drone, HARPER’S MAGAZINE, June 2012, at 17,
available at http://harpers.org/archive/2012/06/eye-of-the-drone/ (describing those killed by a
drone strike in a Pakistani village and the reluctance of families to congregate for fear of being
killed by drones).
70. See Scott Shane, C.I.A. is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 12, 2011, at A1 (relating evidence from various sources that the civilian toll of drone
strikes was significantly than the C.I.A. had claimed); Micah Zenko, Why Won’t the White
House Say How Many Civilians Its Drones Kill?, ATLANTIC (June 5, 2012, 8:45 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/why-wont-the-white-house-say-
how-many-civilians-its-drones-kill/258101/ (noting that John Brennan affirmed in 2011 that
“[t]here hasn’t been a single collateral death because of the exceptional proficiency, precision
of the capabilities we’ve been able to develop”); see also Becker & Shane, supra note 30
(noting that the C.I.A. had previously counted all military-age males killed by drone strikes as
combatants, thereby drastically reducing the number of individuals possibly counted as part of
the civilian death toll).
71. See Murray, supra note 69 (noting that anti-American protests and rhetoric have
increased because of drone strikes); Becker & Shane, supra note 30 (noting that al-Qaeda has
used drone strikes as an effective recruiting tool).
72. See, e.g., Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, U.S., to Patrick J.
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May 2013 speech, particularly when it was politically expedient to do
so.73 However, it also used the classified74 nature of the program to 
attempt to shield itself from media inquiry75 and from any type of
judicial accountability.76 This hypocrisy undermined the credibility of
the administration as the restorer of the rule of law, and instead invited
comparisons to the Bush administration that the Obama administration
likely wanted to avoid for the purposes of garnering international
support.77 
These factors likely influenced President Obama to imply during
his May 2013 speech that the parameters for targeted killings will be
narrowed. There are three areas in which President Obama basically
reiterated known positions of the administration, meaning little
significant change is likely: first, he articulated essentially the same
international law standards78 and “imminence” standard for issuing an
order for a targeted killing that his administration’s representatives had
Leahy, Chairman, Commission on the Judiciary (May 22, 2013), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/23/us/politics/23holder-drone-
lettter.html?_r=1& (detailing the administration’s legal basis for the use of targeted killings
against Anwar al-Aulaqi and other U.S. citizens overseas); Brennan, supra note 47; Holder,
supra note 40; Johnson, supra note 43; Koh, supra note 38.
73. See, e.g., Stephanie Condon, Obama: Anwar al-Awlaki’s Death a “Major Blow” to
al Qaeda and Affiliates, CBSNEWS.COM (Sept. 30, 2011, 4:40 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com
/news/obama-anwar-al-awlakis-death-a-major-blow-to-al-qaeda-and-affiliates/ (relating
comments by President Obama about the strategic importance of the targeted killing Anwar
al-Awlaki, an American citizen in Yemen).
74. See Becker & Shane, supra note 30 (discussing internal administration debates as to
whether to declassify the legal justifications for the drone program, and noting that the
administration decided not to do so); Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to
Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1 (offering details of a still-classified Office of
Legal Counsel memorandum justifying the targeted killings of U.S. citizens).
75. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. U.S Dep’t of Justice, 915 F.Supp.2d 508
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing requests made under the Freedom of Information Act for
documents regarding the targeted killing program, based on the administration’s claim of
necessary secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs).
76. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing the suit
brought by the father of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, which sought an injunction against the
targeted killing of his son, based on a lack of standing and administration claims of necessary
secrecy surrounding counterterrorism programs).
77. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, How Obama Undermined the War on Terror, NEW
REPUBLIC (May 1, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-
destroying-american-support-counterterrorism (arguing that Obama’s lack of transparency on
drones on other issues has undermined U.S. efforts to build alliances that would bolster U.S.
foreign policy and counterterrorism goals).
78. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 5, with Holder, supra note 72, and
Koh, supra note 38 (President Obama articulated proportionality and distinction principles
that largely reflected the standards offered by Attorney General Holder and State Department
Legal Adviser Koh in previous speeches).
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offered previously.79 Second, President Obama reiterated the
administration’s position that U.S. citizenship is no protection against
being targeted for a drone strike.80 Third, President Obama made clear
that secrecy would continue to surround the drone program at the level
that the administration chose to establish.81 
However, President Obama offered one potential change in the
administration’s approach that may help ameliorate some of the negative
media narrative surrounding the killing of civilians by drone strikes and
help bolster foreign support for the U.S. program: he stated that the
administration plans to move away from the use of signature strikes82 in
Yemen, focusing solely on using drone strikes for those individuals
targeted by the administration.83 Although this is merely an aspirational
limitation in Yemen, and President Obama did not indicate that a decline
in the use of signature strikes is a likely possibility for Pakistan in the
near future, this self-imposed goal of attempting to reduce or eliminate
the use of signature strikes in Yemen—many of which have led to well-
publicized and tragic civilian deaths84—is an indication that the Obama 
administration is attempting to shift its strategy in ways that help fulfill
its foreign policy objectives.
B.		 Domestic Boundaries and the Need to Protect Insider Groups
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the majority population in
the United States has been more likely to accept the use of oppressive or
intrusive national security measures so long as the effects of those
measures do not impinge on the rights and privileges of the majority
population,85 but instead are limited to outsider groups whose welfare is
of diminished concern to majority groups.86 However, at the point that
79. See sources cited supra note 78 (articulating similar definitions as to the
“imminence” of a perceived threat for the purposes of ordering a targeted killing).
80. Compare May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 5 (noting that “the high threshold that
we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether
or not they are American citizens”), with Holder, supra note 72.
81. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 5.
82. See Becker & Shane, supra note 30 (explaining that the Obama administration used
“signature strikes” in Pakistan, in which groups of people engaging in apparently suspicious
behavior were allowed to be targeted for a drone strike, even if no terrorists or terrorist
supporters were known to be in the group).
83. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 5.
84. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing civilian deaths from
drone strikes in Yemen).
85. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN L. REV. 953, 988-89 (2002) (noting that
U.S. citizens are complacent about the deprivation of liberty because of explicit or implicit
assurances that citizens’ rights will be left intact).
86. The differential reaction of those within a societal majority to policies that affect
  
         
     
     
       
         
        
       
     
 
    
        
        
     
      
        
    
       
       
 
               
              
               
           
           
             
             
                 
            
                  
           
              
             
               
                
              
                
               
             
             
            
       
              
   
            
   
              
              
 
           
SETTY
2014] TARGETED KILLINGS AND THE INTEREST CONVERGENCE DILEMMA 187
the mainstream public finds that it is impacted negatively by the creep of
national security measures on constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and
liberties, opposition tends to grow dramatically.87 At that point, a rights-
protective shift in policy may occur primarily for the benefit of the
politically powerful group, with the outsider group gaining the ancillary
benefits of that shift, akin to Bell’s theory with regard to interest
convergence in the context of the mid-twentieth century civil rights
movements.88 
The debate over domestic drone use in early 2013 exemplified this
dynamic. In early 2012, Attorney General Holder’s public statement on
drone use made clear that the administration was not bound
geographically,89 that U.S. citizenship was no protection against being
included on the list of targets for a drone strike,90 and that no judicial
process was constitutionally necessary to target U.S. citizens so long as
the administration followed its own careful procedures of determining
whether to target a citizen.91 Scrutiny of this standard increased
dramatically after the February 2013 leak92 of a 2011 Justice Department
outsider groups has been well-documented. See Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared By Law:
Post September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1262
(2004) (noting that “hate violence against Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians . . . [received]
short shrift in governmental, media, or public attention”); Keith Aoki, “Foreign-ness” & 
Asian American Identities: Yellowface, World War II Propaganda and Bifurcated Racial
Stereotypes, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 1, 5-6 (1996) (discussing the disparate legal,
societal, and media treatment of Asian Americans). Some have couched this perspective on
national security laws as part of postcolonial theory. See, e.g., Nick J. Sciullo, The Ghost in
the Global War on Terror: Critical Perspectives and Dangerous Implications for National
Security and the Law, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 561, 575 (2011). For a finding that hate crimes
toward Muslims and Arabs increased dramatically since September 11 highlights the
perceived “otherness” of these groups, see William B. Rubenstein, The Real Story of U.S.
Hate Crimes Statistics: An Empirical Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1213, 1234-40 (2004)
(documenting and analyzing the surge in post September 11 hate crimes). Adrien K. Wing
has thoughtfully analyzed how the current “otherness” of Arabs and Muslims is part of a long
trend in U.S. history of marginalizing particular groups depending on public sentiment at the
time. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis,
Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 LA. L. REV. 717, 721, 728-29 (2003).
87. See, e.g., PEW POL. TYPOLOGY, supra note 67, at 96 (finding that 68% of those
surveyed opined that Americans should not have to forgo pri vacy for national security
reasons, and that this belief was relatively consistent across all political groups).
88. See Bell, supra note 19, at 524.
89. See Holder, supra note 43 (stating “[o]ur legal authority is not limited to the
battlefields in Afghanistan”).
90. See id. (“United States citizenship alone does not make such individuals immune
from being targeted.”).
91. See id. (“‘Due process’ and ‘judicial process’ are not one and the same, particularly
when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial
process.”).
92. See Michael Isikoff, Justice Department Memo Reveals Legal Case for Drone
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white paper93 that outlined legal standards for drone strikes that largely
mirrored Holder’s 2012 statements. After the leak of the white paper,
libertarian-leaning Republican senator Rand Paul wrote a letter to Holder
seeking clarification as to the limits of the administration’s power to
target and kill U.S. citizens who back causes that the government deems 
to be unpopular, invoking in particular the image of celebrity Vietnam
War protester, Jane Fonda, being potentially hit in a drone strike.94 
Holder wrote a reply stating, in effect, that the administration had no
plans to kill U.S. citizens within the United States using a drone strike,
but that it was within the administration’s power to do so if warranted.95 
This exchange set the stage for Paul’s much-publicized filibuster of
the confirmation vote on John Brennan for the position of C.I.A. director
on March 6, 2013, in which he demanded further clarification of the
administration’s power to use drones against U.S. citizens in the United
States.96 In response, on March 7, 2013, Holder wrote a brief letter to
Paul, posing Paul’s question as, “‘Does the President have the authority
to use a weaponized drone to kill an American not engaged in combat on
American soil?’” and responding, “The answer to that question is no.”97 
Two observations with regard to this exchange and the application
of interest convergence theory are applicable here. First, Paul had little
support from other politicians initially, but was later supported by those
Republicans with libertarian tendencies or perhaps just the desire to get
in their jabs at President Obama,98 and by a few Democrats, perhaps
Strikes on Americans, NBC NEWS (Feb. 4, 2013, 5:57 PM), http://investigations.nbcnews.com
/_news/2013/02/04/16843014-justice-department-memo-reveals-legal-case-for-drone-strikes-
on-americans?lite.
93. See DOJ White Paper, supra note 48 (offering similar standards for the use of drone
strikes on U.S. citizens to those articulated by Attorney General Holder in his March 2012
remarks).
94. See Amy Davidson, Rand Paul Gets a Letter from Eric Holder, NEW YORKER (Mar.
7, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/03/rand-paul-gets-a-letter-
from-eric-holder.html (detailing the correspondence between Paul and Holder). In invoking
the image of Fonda, certainly an elite insider by virtue of her race, citizenship, and public
stature, being potentially hit by a Hellfire missile sent from a drone, Senator Paul focused on
the fear that one of “us” may be impacted by the administration’s counterterrorism policies.
95. See Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr, Attorney General, U.S., to Rand Paul, Senator, 
U.S. (Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://www.paul.senate.gov/files/documents/BrennanHol
derResponse.pdf.
96. See Ashley Parker, Rand Paul Leads Filibuster of Brennan Nomination, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2013, 4:59 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/rand-paul-
filibusters-brennan-nomination/.
97. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, U.S., to Rand Paul, Senator, U.S.
(Mar. 7, 2013), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/files/2013
/03/Senator-Rand-Paul-Letter.pdf.
98. See Parker, supra note 96 (noting later support for the filibuster from Republican
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those committed to pushing for any rights protection in the area of drone
use and unbowed by the political danger of being perceived as “soft on
terror.”99 This exemplifies a convergence of interests from different
parts of the political spectrum, something that Bell predicted when the
interests of insider groups are negatively impacted by a policy.100 
Second, Paul’s “success”101 in securing Holder’s admission of
boundaries to the government’s power to use a drone was a rather
limited one: Holder admits that the President does not have the authority
to use lethal drone strikes against U.S. citizens who are on U.S. soil, if
those citizens are not engaged in combat. 102 As a libertarian-leaning
politician who has repeatedly voiced concern that counterterrorism
powers may be used to target right-wing gun owners,103 this limited
protection may be sufficient for Senator Paul’s constituency (assuming
they are not engaged in “combat” per Holder’s letter), but the letter
offers no protection to U.S. citizens overseas or non-citizens anywhere in
the world, including on U.S. soil. On the one hand, those interested in
increased rights protection may celebrate Holder’s post-filibuster letter
as acknowledging at least some limit on the legal authority of the
President to order a drone strike; on the other hand, the placement of that
limit exemplifies Bell’s point that when the interests of the powerful
majority are satisfied, it is unlikely that a minority group needing
additional protection will be successful in its efforts.
III. LIMITS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Interest convergence analysis allows us to consider how the
interests of powerful elites can, as an ancillary matter, inure to the
benefit of outsider groups, but there are some serious limitations to
considering interest convergence as a prospective approach to rights-
protective policy making. When reflecting on the phenomenon of
interest convergence, Professor Bell concluded with some 
disappointment that civil rights groups like the NAACP allowed the
fight for racial justice to be compromised and perhaps co-opted by a 
government focused primarily on foreign policy and anti-communist
senators Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz).
99. See id. (noting support for the filibuster from Democratic senator Ron Wyden).
100. See Bell, supra note 19, at 524.
101. See Davidson, supra note 94 (noting Senator Paul’s comment, “I’ve kind of won
my battle”).
102. Holder, supra note 97 (emphasis added).
103. See Setty, supra note 9, at 219 (detailing Rand Paul’s libertarian argument against
the renewal of Patriot Act amendments that might allow for the targeting of right -wing gun
owners).
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concerns.104 Although I appreciate Bell’s disappointment on the lack of
will to focus fully on rights protection, the NAACP’s motivation in
aligning its work with the government’s anti-communist platform makes
sense from a realpolitik approach: even a limited victory in the realm of
racial justice would be achieved only through the garnering of some
measure of political and popular support; this support was highly
vulnerable to attacks based on perceived communist sympathies; and
without the support, courts were unlikely to support civil rights
measures, no matter how important racial justice was.
Likewise, in the post-9/11 landscape in which significant political
support for those marginalized by the national security state is hard to
marshal, focusing on specific issues where interest convergence allows
for the achievement of political victories without the vulnerability of
being labeled “soft on terror” is a matter of negotiating otherwise
precarious political realities.105 Yet leveraging interest convergence to
realize rights-protective gains is not a straightforward affair.106 
Bell recognized the natural limitation of interest convergence,
namely, when the interests of the majority diverge from that of the
outsider group, then the majority will no longer spend its political capital
on a measure that happens to be rights-protective. Bell argued in the
education context that truly effective desegregation remedies were
unavailable in the line of school segregation cases following Brown
because whites eventually believed that they may suffer substantial
negative effects, or may not inure any benefits, from large-scale
desegregation measures.107 Therefore, at the point at which the cost to
the white majority of desegregation outweighed its benefits,
desegregation no longer became a priority. As such, the promise of
integration—as opposed to the mere removal of de jure segregation— 
104. See Derrick Bell, Racial Equality: Progressives’ Passion for the Unattainable, 94
VA. L. REV. 495, 509-10 (2008) (reviewing RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL
RIGHTS (2007)) (lamenting the NAACP’s refusal to provide legal assistance to individuals
such as Paul Robeson and W.E.B. Du Bois, who were perceived as being “too involved with
far-left groups,” that intimated potential communist ties).
105. The May 2013 NDU Speech was critiqued immediately by some Republicans as
reflecting Obama being “soft on terror.” See Doyle McManus, Rebooting the War on Terror, 
L.A. TIMES (May 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/26/opinion/la-oe-mcmanus-
obama-drones-gitmo-20130526 (citing Republican senator Saxby Chambliss and others as
characterizing the president as weak on counterterrorism issues).
106. Amartya Sen’s theory of justice predicated on guiding “reasoned choice of
policies, strategies or institutions” apart from identifying “fully just social arrangements” is
particularly useful here, given that agreement—legal, moral or political—on what constitutes
a fully just social arrangement is not possible for those coming from different philosophies
and perspectives. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 15 (2009).
107. Bell, supra note 19, at 526-33.
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contemplated in Brown was never achieved.108 Extrapolating from
Bell’s point, certain issues of social justice—whether in the realm of
civil rights or national security—that are not ripe for interest
convergence but raise serious rights concerns may never be addressed,
even in a limited fashion.109 
Along those same lines, thus far the few limitations that have been
articulated with regard to the targeted killings program end at the point
where interest convergence no longer exists: outside of the United States
(and, therefore, not a popular cause of libertarians); when the insider
group of U.S citizens on U.S. soil is seen to be adequately protected; and
where the foreign policy concerns are seen to be at least adequately
handled in the short term, such as aspiring to limit the highly visible and
damaging signature strikes in some regions where they are used.110 
Further, the administration’s stated limits on the use of drones
reflect a unilateral legal interpretation of the applicable international and
domestic legal constraints, meaning that the debate has had little effect
on the vast scope of the counterterrorism power that has aggregated in
108. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v.
Board of Education: Law Reform and the Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV.
547, 548 (1994) (arguing that Brown accomplished relatively little in terms of reducing de
facto segregation).
109. This is clear in the context of the Obama administration limiting the obliga tion to
read Miranda rights for those suspected of terrorism. See Internal Memorandum, Fed. Bureau
of Investigation, Custodial Interrogation for Pub. Safety and Intelligence-Gathering Purposes
of Operational Terrorists Arrested Inside the U.S. (Oct. 21, 2010), printed in F.B.I
Memorandum, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25mi
randa-text.html (providing an internal memorandum from the F.B.I. that recommends
withholding Miranda rights from terrorism suspects). Although the l arger criminal defense
bar may have had strong objections to the chipping away of Miranda rights if the FBI policy
applied to a broader group of suspects, limitation of the policy to terrorism suspects has
defused strong objections from the non-terrorism defense bar. The use of this limitation in the
context of Dzhokar Tsarnaev’s interrogation in conjunction with the Boston Marathon
bombings of April 2013 sparked some debate. See Devlin Barrett, Siobhan Gorman & Tamer
El-Ghobashy, Judge Made Call to Advise Suspect of Rights, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323789704578444940173125374.html
(reporting the debate over the reading of Miranda rights that displaced the FBI’s plan to
interrogate Tsarnaev further without reading him Miranda warnings).
110. See Anup Kaphle, How Pakistanis Reacted to Obama’s New Guidelines for Drone
Strikes, WASH. POST (May 24, 2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/w
orldviews/wp/2013/05/24/how-pakistanis-reacted-to-obamas-speech-on-drones/ (noting that
the speech may mollify some concerns of the Pakistani government and allow for better
communication between the U.S. and Pakistan, but that many human rights advocates and
government officials remained disappointed by the continuation of the targeted killing
program); J. Dana Stuster, Pakistan Says Obama Drone Speech Too Little, Too Late, 
FOREIGNPOLICY.COM (May 24, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/
05/24/pakistan_yemen_obama_drone_guantanamo_terrorism_speech (offering similar mixed
reactions to the May 2013 NDU Speech from Pakistan and Yemen).
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the executive branch since September 2001.111 In his May 2013 speech,
President Obama stated that he welcomed a conversation with Congress
about a potential drone court—akin to the FISA court112—but noted that,
given the scope of executive power in the area of foreign policy and
counterterrorism, such a court may not be constitutional.113 
Ironically, given the excessive deference of the judiciary to the
executive branch in the last decade,114 it is possible that more rigorous
oversight of the targeted killing program would be found
unconstitutional. In 2009, President Obama’s rhetoric about restoring
the rule of law and curtailing the perceived abuses of executive power115 
arguably could have translated into meaningful reform that differentiated
the Obama administration from the Bush administration’s approach on
the exercise of unilateral executive power.116 But repeated invocations
of broad executive power and the excessive secrecy that has surrounded
many of the Obama administration’s policies, combined with excessive
deference from the judiciary117 and a lack of action in Congress has 
essentially given a bipartisan imprimatur to an extremely broad
executive power with regard to national security matters.
Interest convergence would not enable a change in the scope of
executive power, or for political will to be marshaled in favor of further
111. For comprehensive treatment of the aggregation of presidential counterterrorism
power in during the Bush Administration, see generally JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY (2009) (addressing the problematic aggregation of executive power during the
Bush administration); FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND
UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007). For similar assessments
of presidential power during the Obama administration, see generally Aziz Rana, Ten 
Questions, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 5099 (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so
l3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2193084; Afsheen John Radsan, Bush and Obama Fight Terrorists
Outside Justice Jackson’s Twilight Zone, 26 CONST. COMMENT 551 (2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684720.
112. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95–511 (1978)
(establishing a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to deal with surveillance requests for
intelligence gathering).
113. See May 2013 NDU Speech, supra note 5.
114. See generally Sudha Setty, Judicial Formalism and the State Secrets Privilege, 38
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1629 (2012) (critiquing the judiciary for unwarranted deference to the
administration with regard to the state secrets privilege).
115. See Editorial, Mr. Obama and the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at WK
7 (detailing the ways in which the Obama administration had already deviated from campaign
promises to curtail executive power and restore the rule of law with regard to national security
policies).
116. See Setty, supra note 17, at 596-98 (2009) (discussing the ways in which the Bush
administration employed a unilateralist unitary executive theory of power with regard to
national security).
117. See Setty, supra note 114, at 1633-39 (detailing the overly deferential attitude of
courts to invocations of the state secrets privilege by the Obama administration).
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limitations on targeted killings unless the interests of the majority appear
to be affected more directly by the program, as was perceived in the
context of Senator Paul’s filibuster, or unless another interest of the
majority is met by a curtailing of the program.118 
CONCLUSION
Professor Bell posited that African Americans achieved some 
measure of racial justice primarily as third-party beneficiaries of
government actions meant to fulfill the goals of more politically
powerful constituents. The Emancipation Proclamation helped the
Union recruit freed slaves as soldiers and disrupt the Confederate work
force; the post-Civil War amendments solidified political power for the
Republican Party; Brown v. Board of Education buttressed U.S. efforts
to improve its international standing and foreign policy during the Cold
War.119 
As of this writing, it is too early to evaluate whether the promises of
President Obama’s May 2013 speech will translate into substantive
changes in the administration’s policy with regard to targeted killings.120 
Perhaps interests such as foreign policy or the need to protect powerful
insider groups will move the debate over the limits of drone use in the
future; perhaps a desire for President Obama to establish his own legacy
as the president who restored the rule of law to the U.S. post-9/11
counterterrorism efforts will lead to the courts and Congress becoming
more meaningfully involved in the decision-making process with regard
to drones. In using interest convergence to evaluate the ways in which
the parameters of the drone program have evolved this far, we can better
understand the possibilities and ramifications for future debates.
118. See Setty, supra note 9, at 211-25 (detailing various aspects of interest
convergence that may pertain to national security policies).
119. DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE
UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 71 (2004). Certainly this historical account is not
without opposition. Bruce Ackerman categorizes the political momentum behind the post-
Civil War amendments as legislators acting in a statesmen-like “higher lawmaking” capacity.
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 207 (1998).
120. Organizations committed to civil liberties continue to critique the Obama
administration with regard to its targeted killings policy, seeking greater transparency as to the
legal foundation and operations of the program, accountability for civilian casualties, and
clarifications as to policy changes that may have developed since the May 2013 NDU Speech.
See, e.g., Letter from American Civil Liberties Union et al., to Barack Obama, President of the
U.S. (Dec. 4, 2013), published in Joint Letter to President Obama on Drone Strikes and
Targeted Killings, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/
12/05/joint-letter-president-obama-drone-strikes-and-targeted-killings.
